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This article presents a new framework for measuring civilian control of the armed
forces in post-transition Latin America. Specifically, it builds on approaches that
focus on military privileges and military protest, particularly in the face of govern-
ment challenges to those privileges. Adding mission performance as a third dimen-
sion both helps us measure civilian control more accurately and provides causal
leverage, as the three dimensions can interact. The paper demonstrates the utility
of the framework through a close-up analysis of a critical case: civil–military relations
in Peru since the 1990s.
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Latin America’s transitions from military rule in the late 1970s and 1980s stimulated
a rich literature on the power of elected governments to control armed forces in the
new democratic context. Some scholars have focused on the extent to which civi-
lians exercise power in different policy arenas that are ordered hierarchically
according to their importance for democratic civil–military relations. Other analysts
instead have measured civilian control based on military privileges and military
pushback—for instance, in the form of lobbying or rebellion—particularly when the
government challenges those privileges. When it comes to the question of who con-
trols military participation in different missions, these approaches either conceptua-
lize mission performance as one of many policy realms or omit it altogether, thereby
impeding our understanding of post-transition civil–military relations in two ways.
First, they prevent us from answering the critical descriptive question of who
controls military missions. Now that the military is out of government and in the
barracks, we should be able to understand who controls the missions it conducts
from the barracks. Second, they obscure causal interaction among different dimen-
sions of civilian control.
In contrast to prior approaches, this article proposes adding another dimension to
the privileges/pushback framework: mission performance. In response to a civilian
command, the military may refuse to do the work (less control), conduct the mission
as ordered (more control), or proactively conduct missions more intensively than
instructed (less control). The paper demonstrates the utility of the framework
through a close-up analysis of a critical case, civil–military relations in Peru since
the 1990s. It shows the interaction of the dimensions of military mission perfor-
mance and military privileges. Specifically, it shows how military inaction in the
face of government orders to perform counterinsurgency triggered the government
to reinstate military autonomy vis-a`-vis civilian courts.
Research on military mission performance in Latin America is timely, as it is rel-
evant to questions of state capacity and civilian control, two foundations for effec-
tive democracy. Working state institutions that provide citizens some degree of
protections, representation, and continuity are viewed as key for building stable,
competitive democracy in the region’s post-transition environment.1 The actions
of state security forces to provide security and maintain order arise as an important
dimension of state performance. In the Andean region, which stands out for its complex
and intense insecurity, the government has relied on military force in particular for these
services. At the same time that strong institutions—including functioning armed
forces—may help achieve order important for stable democracy, scholars have worried
that some missions may lead the armed forces to spread into new arenas of action, espe-
cially since recent transitions to democracy and the conclusion of the Cold War have
thrown military missions into flux.2 Given these normative concerns about strengthen-
ing state capacity, reducing insecurity, and containing military power, it is crucial to
analyze the missions militaries perform and civilian control over those missions.
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The Dimensions: Military Prerogatives, Contestation, and
Mission Performance
This article proposes that we move beyond the two dominant paradigms for
evaluating civilian control of Latin American militaries, which either isolate civilian
control of missions as an advanced step toward achieving civilian control more
generally or leave out mission performance altogether. One approach to measuring
civilian control of the armed forces is to order policy arenas hierarchically, in terms
of importance of civilian control for democracy; and temporally, in terms of when
we expect the government to achieve control after the transition. Concretely,
scholars posit that following transition to democracy it is most urgent to reduce mil-
itary power in arenas such as human rights and the budgetary process. Only as a last
step toward achieving a high level of civilian control does the government gain
power over military missions.3
Contrary to the trend of ordering policy arenas hierarchically, this article builds
on a second paradigm, which focuses on military privileges and military push-back
against government actions. Beginning with Alfred Stepan (1998), many experts on
civil–military relations in Latin America have measured civilian control by consid-
ering one or both of two dimensions: (1) ‘‘military prerogatives,’’ or powers—gen-
erally formalized in legal structures—that the military presumes it holds, and (2)
‘‘articulated military contestation,’’ or protest against the government, often in
response to civilian challenges to the prerogatives.4 For instance, military contesta-
tion may take the form of lobbying congress or staging a coup.5 In terms of missions,
Stepan’s model does address military prerogatives to define and carry out security
work. However, it does not incorporate the question of government orders to per-
form missions and the military’s response to those directives.
By adding a second behavioral dimension to Stepan’s prerogatives-contestation
model, military mission performance, we achieve a more complete and accurate
framework for analyzing civil–military relations in Latin America. The new dimen-
sion brings to the fore the possibility of a military behavior not previously consid-
ered by experts of Latin American civil–military relations. Existing analyses
either emphasize ‘‘mission creep,’’ the phenomenon by which militaries proactively
take on new missions,6 or argue that civilians in government have invited the mili-
tary to perform those missions.7 Neither approach leaves room for the military to reject
assigned work.8 In contrast, the framework proposed here explicitly allows for mili-
taries to underperform assignments.
This military resistance can be situated in relation to Peter Feaver’s work on the
U.S. armed forces’ ‘‘shirking,’’ defined as follows: ‘‘when the military, whether
through laziness, insolence, or preventable incompetence, does not do what the civil-
ian has requested, or not in the way the civilian wanted, or in such a way as to under-
mine the ability of the civilian to make future decisions.’’9 Because the U.S. case
exhibits an exceptionally high level of civilian control of military missions, Feaver’s
approach to shirking cannot be applied directly to Latin America. For instance, in the
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United States, it makes sense to include in the definition of shirking both the degree
to which a military performs a mission as well as the way in which it carries it out. In
contrast, in post-transition Latin America, we worry about the basic question of
which missions militaries perform.10
The mission performance dimension not only helps us measure control of mis-
sions more accurately, but it also helps us systematically study potential causal inter-
actions among the dimensions of civilian control. Different from approaches that
order policy arenas hierarchically or view civilian influence on mission performance
as a final step toward achieving full civilian control, this article will demonstrate that
even after basic prerogatives have been scaled back, they may not be gone for good,
due to military behavior in the mission arena. That is, lobbying, staging protests or
coups, or other forms of ‘‘contestation’’ are only one category of military backlash in
the face of reduced prerogatives. Reductions may also trigger the military to exercise
autonomy in how they perform missions, either by reaching out for added missions
or by resisting orders to act. Conversely, the armed forces may refuse to perform a
mission in order to pressure the government to restore certain prerogatives.
Beyond its contribution to descriptive and causal analysis of civil–military rela-
tions in Latin America, at a more fundamental level, the mission performance
dimension informs our understanding of government control of state functions. Max
Weber famously articulated how, as powerful arms of the state, modern bureaucra-
cies facilitate the specialization of state functions: ‘‘Bureaucratization offers above
all the optimum possibility for carrying through the principle of specializing admin-
istrative functions according to purely objective considerations.’’11 Critical for
Weber is that, in order to control the state’s many functions, the ‘‘dilettante’’ poli-
tician engages in an ongoing struggle to control the ‘‘expert’’ bureaucrats.12 In terms
of the armed forces (a specific component of the state apparatus), the military’s basic
function is security provision, or ‘‘the management of violence,’’13 and the only way
to effectively analyze government control of that function is by treating mission per-
formance as its own dimension.
This article’s focus on Peru since Alberto Fujimori’s government (1990–2000) is
beneficial for studies of civilian control and military missions for three central rea-
sons. First, it fills an empirical gap by systematically analyzing recent changes in
Peruvian military prerogatives. Comparative research on post-democratization
civil–military relations in Latin America has placed great importance on Peru from
democratization in 1980 into the 1990s,14 but it has not yet thoroughly analyzed the
critical period since Fujimori—renowned for politicizing the military—left office.15
Second, the case offers a particularly dynamic context in which to apply the pro-
posed framework. Since Fujimori’s departure, the government has reduced military
prerogatives considerably. These reductions have caused the armed forces to dis-
obey government orders to conduct counterinsurgency, and this defiance, in turn, has
pressed the government to reinstate certain military prerogatives.
Third, that the Peruvian military’s relevant mission has been counterinsurgency is
both theoretically and normatively important. On a theoretical level, the case study
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serves as a ‘‘critical case’’: Peru’s military seems ‘‘least likely’’ to neglect counter-
insurgency.16 Specifically, the mission is widely considered a highly professional,
and therefore attractive, mission among Latin American militaries,17 the Peruvian
case being no exception. Furthermore, conducting counterinsurgency has been the
most obvious way for Peru’s armed forces to increase their budget, in a context of
ongoing cuts in defense spending.18 Counterinsurgency neglect is also of normative
concern: the armed forces are generally the only state institution equipped to per-
form the mission throughout the region. Therefore, lack of military attention in this
arena could have grave implications for security in countries that continue facing
insurgency or the prospect thereof.
Method
This article is based mainly on research carried out by the author in Peru during 2005
and 2006. Semistructured interviews were conducted with seventy-five Peruvian
Army officers ranging from lieutenants to retired generals. The author interviewed
officers identified through chain referrals and also instructors and students from the
war college (Escuela Superior de Guerra) and from courses at the different service
schools in the capital city of Lima. Study at these schools was required of officers of
varying ranks wanting to be considered for promotion, and therefore the sampling
method ensured access to officers who recently had served in different capacities
on bases throughout the country. Furthermore, by interviewing officers attending
courses required for promotion, the author did not interview officers from particular
professional, ideological, or friendship circles within the army, a common risk in
research that relies entirely on referral chains. To supplement these interviews, the
author interviewed officers on a key army base in an insurgency zone. Outside of the
army, interviews were conducted with over ninety-three journalists; academics; non-
governmental organization representatives; private sector actors; navy, air force, and
police officers; elected and appointed local, regional, and national political officials;
and officials from the U.S. defense and state departments. Other data sources include
government statistics, newspaper archives, and army doctrinal materials. Additional
research was conducted in Lima in early 2009.
Post-Fujimori Peru
The following analysis applies the proposed three-dimensional framework to Peru.
It first grounds the discussion by providing an overview of insecurity and civil–
military relations during the first two decades of Peru’s democracy. A second section
demonstrates decreased prerogatives and low contestation since Fujimori left office
in several policy arenas that range from the civil–military balance in governing to
defense spending to internal security. Therefore, if we combined Stepan’s
prerogatives-contestation framework with the other dominant approach to ordering
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policy arenas in terms of their importance for democracy, we would observe a
significant degree of civilian control.
Moving beyond these approaches, the third and final section demonstrates the
utility of the proposed framework. It shows that along the mission performance
dimension, we observe important across-time variation in military responsiveness
to government orders. Furthermore, mission performance has interacted with prero-
gatives. Reduced military autonomy vis-a`-vis the civilian justice system led the mil-
itary to refuse to perform its assigned security work. This resistance triggered the
government to increase once again the military’s autonomy in the judicial arena,
which, in turn, led to a return to military responsiveness.
Democracy and Insecurity, 1980–2000
During Peru’s first two decades of democracy, the military was deeply embroiled in
counterinsurgency against Sendero Luminoso and the smaller Movimiento Revolu-
cionario Tu´pac Amaru (MRTA).19 As the insurgency threat expanded, so too did
the military’s political power, which peaked under Fujimori. For instance, a November
1991 decree (Legislative Decree 749) placed ‘‘political–military commanders’’ in
charge of all public and private resources in emergency zones, which by December
of that year covered 47 percent of Peru’s provinces.20 Two 1995 amnesty laws (Laws
26479 and 26492) granted impunity to members of state security forces for all actions
in emergency zones since 1980.
When Fujimori resigned in 2000, the insurgency threat was relatively small. The
MRTA had dissolved after its final significant act in 1997 (the taking of hostages at the
Japanese ambassador’s home), and Sendero had declined precipitously after an elite
police force captured its leader, Abimael Guzma´n, in 1992. In addition, the armed forces
had effectively reduced Sendero’s power in the countryside; only small pockets of the
country continued seeing Sendero military training, occasional attacks on police anti-
narcotics operations, and some threats and kidnappings in remote towns. In particular,
Sendero has continued activities in the Valley of the Apurı´mac and Ene Rivers (Valle de
los rı´os Apurı´mac y Ene [VRAE]) in Peru’s southern highlands, and in the Upper
Huallaga Valley (Valle del Alto Huallaga [VAH]) in the central highlands.
If the 1990s saw expanded military political power and aggressive counterinsur-
gency efforts, that period also witnessed great corruption and manipulation of the
armed forces. Fujimori relied on military support in order to carry out his 1992 auto-
golpe (self coup).21 The government further politicized the military using it for tar-
geted civic action programs and for the distribution of progovernment propaganda
during presidential campaigns.22 Headed by Vladimiro Montesinos, Fujimori’s
intelligence advisor, the national intelligence agency (Servicio de Inteligencia
Nacional [SIN]) spied on military personnel to guarantee loyalty to the government
and to Montesinos himself.23 As for military financing, the armed forces underwent
‘‘total corruption’’ through their antinarcotics work,24 and the government channeled
resources to the military with decrees that lacked the oversight required by law.25
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When Fujimori left office, the military had a stockpile of deficient war materials
obtained through arms deals that bought for the armed forces equipment while lining
the pockets of Montesinos and high-level military officers.26
Military Reform and Contestation
Legal reforms since Fujimori left office have greatly reduced military prerogatives in
many policy arenas without triggering significant contestation. The transition has been
particularly dramatic in Sendero zones, where the armed forces have moved from being
completely responsible for security, public and private resources, and the entire political
arena more broadly, to playing a much smaller role in politics and society.
Power to govern. Civilian governing power in post-transition contexts can be eval-
uated at the national level by examining the civil–military balance in the defense
ministry.27 By this standard, civilians have increased their power over the military
since 2000. A 2002 defense ministry law (Law 27860) gave the minister more
authority over the armed forces and increased organizational differentiation by
establishing two vice ministries—one for administrative and economic matters and
a second to oversee logistics and personnel issues. The law was rewritten again in
2007 (Law 29075), further increasing specialization within the ministry and execu-
tive control of the armed forces, for the first time defining the defense minister as
‘‘Supreme Head of the Armed Forces.’’
In this context, civilian presence in the ministry has increased. When he took
office, President Alejandro Toledo (2001–2006) appointed the country’s first civil-
ian defense minister, David Waisman, followed by the civilian lawyer, Aurelio Loret
de Mola. (His two subsequent ministers were retired generals, Roberto Chiabra Leo´n
and Marciano Rengifo Ruiz.) As of early 2009, President Alan Garcı´a (2006 to pres-
ent) had appointed only civilians since taking office in July 2006, Allan Wagner
Tizo´n and Antero Florez Ara´oz. Civilians and retired officers have served as vice
ministers during the Toledo and Garcı´a administrations.28
At the subnational level, the military’s power to govern has also been reduced sub-
stantially since Fujimori’s resignation. Judicial and executive decisions have reduced
military authority in Sendero zones, where the military is now responsible for provid-
ing security (see below) but no longer wields economic or political power.
Human rights. The issue of holding military personnel accountable for past
human rights abuses has been highly sensitive in post-transition Latin America and
is thus a major component of measures of civilian control.29 Peru’s judiciary has
taken important steps toward bringing military personnel to trial for the widespread
abuses committed during the 1980–2000 internal conflict, without spurring military
rebellion.
After Fujimori’s departure, legal change opened the way for army personnel to be
tried in civilian courts for human rights abuses. Most notably, amnesty crumbled
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through two interrelated processes. At the domestic level, transitional President
Valentı´n Paniagua (2000–2001) initiated the National Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (CVR) to investigate human rights abuses.30 The CVR’s 2003 report
estimated nearly 70,000 deaths and disappearances, attributing approximately
32 percent to the armed forces and 56 percent to Sendero.31 With its report, the com-
mission presented forty-seven human rights cases to the Peruvian justice system.
Internationally, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found Peru’s 1995
amnesty laws inconsistent with the American Convention on Human Rights and
therefore inapplicable to all human rights cases in Peru.32 In response to the decision,
Peru’s civilian justice system opened all forty-seven of the CVR cases by late 2005.33
Of the total 339 individuals accused, 281 were or had been in the military.34
Alongside the reversal of the amnesty, internal shifts in the Peruvian justice sys-
tem strengthened its jurisdiction over human rights cases involving the armed forces.
For instance, there is the question of delitos de funcio´n (function-related crimes).
Well into Toledo’s term, crimes committed by the military and police in emergency
zones legally qualified as delitos de funcio´n and therefore constitutionally fell under
the purview of military courts. This practice was changed in August 2004, when the
constitutional tribunal ruled that delitos de funcio´n excluded all cases in which civi-
lians are harmed. Following the tribunal’s example, the supreme court also began
applying the concept narrowly.35
Given these developments, the human rights issue has been the most sensitive
topic in contemporary Peruvian civil–military relations. During interviews for this
study, officers complained profusely about human rights developments. Those who
had served during the high point of the conflict were particularly bitter: thirty-nine of
the fifty mid-ranking and senior officers—here, the ‘‘senior cohort’’—broached the
topic of human rights without prompt.36 They often said that there were always
‘‘excesses’’ in any major internal conflict and that therefore the abuses had been una-
voidable. Several of them claimed that as ‘‘terrorists,’’ guerrillas should not receive
legal protections at all.
Considering the sensitivity of the senior cohort to the human rights question, the
military’s response to changes in this arena has been mild. For instance, military
courts have investigated some human rights cases independent of the civilian justice
system.37 Defense ministers with prior military service experience have attempted to
protect military personnel from trials by illegally refusing to release the identity of
military personnel to their would-be accusers.38 Once facing charges of abuses, army
personnel have enjoyed further military institutional support. The Sol de Solidari-
dad, a program instituted by the head of the army as of early 2005, transferred one
sol (approximately thirty U.S. cents) from every officer paycheck to help cover the
legal fees of army personnel involved in human rights cases.39
These reactions to human rights developments are miniscule in comparison to the
renowned rebellions of the carapintadas when Argentina’s government pursued the
human rights issue in the wake of democratization.40 The Peruvian armed forces’
actions also pale in comparison to the 1993 Boinazo in Chile, during which
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approximately forty armed, uniformed commandos mobilized publicly (wearing
boinas, or berets) amid investigations of about 800 cases of human rights abuses that
had occurred under military rule.41
Budget. The literature on civil–military relations in Latin America offers two rub-
rics for evaluating civilian control of the defense budget: civilians in government
should have the capacity to reduce defense spending, and defense budget allocations
should be transparent.42
Civilian control in Peru has increased on both fronts. The defense budget has
steadily contracted as a percentage of national spending since the late 1980s, from
14.4 percent in 1989 to 8 percent in 2006.43 Of course, Fujimori’s decrees and shady
arms deals offset cuts in the official defense budget in the 1990s. However, without
these added resources, further budget reductions have not spurred military protest.
Transparency has also improved. Paniagua’s government purged generals loyal to
Fujimori and Montesinos, and the judiciary opened multiple cases of corruption
against military officers shortly after the transition.44 Military budget information
is now available to the public in a format comparable to budgets of other minis-
tries for purposes of congressional analysis.45
Importantly, progress toward civilian control of military spending has been par-
tial. For instance, auditing is largely internal to the armed forces.46 The ‘‘defense
fund,’’ established in 2004 (by Law 28455), channels profits from Peru’s private nat-
ural gas conglomerate (Camisea) toward the military and police for equipment
acquisition and maintenance. The fund represents a pocket of military autonomy,
both because it is automatically allocated equally across the military branches (and
national police) without congressional input and because it is spent with almost no
congressional oversight.47 As of late 2008, the national legislature was debating
increasing the fund.48 According to security experts involved in the creation of the
defense law and the program to expand it, the military initiated both projects.
Education. Military education reform in Peru has been noteworthy according to
the standards that civilians should influence course content49 and that the military
should be trained to respect human rights.50 Civilian instruction in Peru’s Army
institutions began in 2001, with an army project (SIEDE) intended to improve
officer education. Cadets now receive a university degree upon graduating from the
officer formation school, the Escuela Militar de Chorrillos, where they study under
both military instructors and civilian university professors.51 Beyond the Escuela
Militar, army majors must study at civilian universities in order to advance to the
rank of lieutenant colonel, according to a senior officer who had been involved in
the education reforms. Military education has been further civilianized through
changes to the Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (CAEN).52 The 2002 defense
ministry law moved CAEN from the jurisdiction of the military joint command to
that of the defense ministry. With this change, CAEN augmented its course offerings
to attract civilian government officials and journalists.53 augmented civilian
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involvement in military education has not been a smooth process. For instance, in
2005 CAEN’s first civilian director resigned after taking the post only days earlier,
because the military opposed his project to reform the institution.54 In addition, with
CAEN no longer strictly a military institution, the army sidestepped the school in
2003 by creating its ‘‘high command’’ course within the army war college (ESG).55
As for human rights education, military instruction has increased, particularly in
international humanitarian law (IHL). Between 2002 and 2004, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) trained 522 Peruvian military instructors
throughout the country.56 In May 2004, a defense ministerial resolution approved
a military directive to integrate IHL into military doctrine and training.57 Impor-
tantly, the amount and content of military instruction in IHL and human rights have
faced criticism. An ICRC source explained that as of 2006, army tactical training in
IHL omitted many important situations, such as those involving civilians, schools, or
prisoners of war. In terms of amount of instruction, the ESG’s year-long high com-
mand course consisted of 1,692 class and lecture hours. Of that, only 108 hours were
devoted to international law, a subset of which presumably consisted of IHL and
human rights law.58 Army cadets graduating in 2003 studied only one unit of IHL
during each of their last two years at the Escuela Militar and one unit on human
rights during each of their last three years, of between twenty-two and twenty-
four total annual units.59
Internal security. Peru’s military has seen considerable reductions to its internal
security prerogatives in addition to the changes in the human rights arena discussed
above. By the end of his administration, Fujimori lifted all emergency decrees put in
place for counterinsurgency purposes. The Toledo government decreed only a few,
small pockets of the VRAE as emergency zones, placing the military in charge of
security there, in June 2003.60 (Since then, decrees have renewed the military’s
assignment there on a continuous basis.) In the VAH, we observe the reinstatement
of police dominance. Since 2006, emergency decrees have established a zone of
emergency in the valley, assigning the police to head the security effort.
As another important indicator of reduced military prerogatives in internal secu-
rity, reforms have placed important checks on the autonomy of Peru’s intelligence
sector, and though the process proved challenging, the hurtles did not involve
military contestation. A June 2001 law (Law 27479) created the Consejo Nacional
de Inteligencia (CNI) to replace the SIN. The reform did not change the agency’s
reputation for being highly militarized, corrupt, conspiring, and free of judicial and
legislative oversight, and the CNI was thus viewed as a change in name only.61
The Toledo government initiated a new intelligence reform in late 2003, and in
December 2005, the legislature replaced the CNI with the Direccio´n Nacional de
Inteligencia (DINI), true progress toward reducing military power in the intelligence
arena.62 The legislature can now access intelligence information, Peru’s national
audit office can monitor intelligence funds, and all special operations by intelligence
agencies, such as wiretapping, require preapproval by the judiciary.63
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External defense. We have not observed a civilian challenge to military preroga-
tives in external defense in the post-Fujimori period, though because the Peruvian
military has not faced external warfare since the 1995 Peru-Ecuador Cenepa War,
perhaps, the setting has not been ripe to evaluate civil–military relations in this
realm. Nonetheless, civilian and military security experts consulted in 2005 and
2006 said that civilians wielded virtually no influence over the military’s work in
external defense. Specifically, the armed forces have on their own defined their
actual external defense work, which mainly consists of on-base training but also
includes limited patrols along Peru’s northern border with Colombia and military
exercises near the Peru–Bolivia border.
To summarize this discussion, Peru’s government has reduced the armed forces’
prerogatives in many policy arenas without triggering significant contestation. That
is, if we applied the prerogatives-contestation framework, the hierarchy of policy
arenas approach, or a combination of the two, we would conclude that Peru’s gov-
ernment enjoys a high level of control of the military. However, the next section
argues that in fact these two paradigms obscure important, ongoing military power.
The discussion analyzes the Peruvian army’s mission performance, demonstrating
that adding this dimension to the prerogatives-contestation framework helps us to
evaluate control over the military’s most basic function of security provision. The
section further shows how we can observe causal interactions between two of the
three dimensions of the revised model.
Mission Performance: Military Responsiveness and Resistance to
Government Orders
The single relevant security mission for Peru’s military—and especially the army—
since Fujimori’s departure has been counterinsurgency: the insurgent threat remains
salient (though less so than in earlier years), the government has ordered the army to
perform counterinsurgency, and the mission is the only security work the army has
performed on an ongoing basis, other than the highly limited border patrols dis-
cussed above. We therefore turn to counterinsurgency in order to evaluate the mili-
tary’s mission performance. The following analysis demonstrates interaction
between prerogatives and mission performance. Specifically, we will see that reduc-
tions in the military prerogative of autonomy vis-a`-vis the judiciary in human rights
matters led to military resistance to counterinsurgency orders. That resistance trig-
gered the government to grant the armed forces autonomy once again in the human
rights arena, which caused the military to respond to government demands for
counterinsurgency (Figure 1).
Resistance. Although Sendero is nothing like it was during the 1980s and 1990s in
terms of its military prowess, the government, police, communities, and human
rights organizations have still worried about the threat it poses. Indeed, what the
government has wanted the Peruvian army to focus on most is eliminating the
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remnants of the insurgency. In this context, throughout Toledo’s administration and
during the first eighteen months of the current Garcı´a government, Peru’s army
disobeyed orders to conduct more assertive counterinsurgency operations.
The government pursued multiple avenues to encourage counterinsurgency. As
mentioned, a constant state of emergency has been in place in parts of the VRAE
since June 2003, with the military legally in charge of internal security. Furthermore,
in the VAH since early 2006, the armed forces have been responsible for counterin-
surgency operations in support of police security efforts.64 Politicians sought to
increase the army’s counterinsurgency role beyond emergency zones, as well: when
the army claimed that the eight days permitted for operations outside of emergency
zones were insufficient for effective operations, the congress extended the period to
thirty days (with the 2004 Law 28222). Moving beyond legal structures, high-level
officials in the defense and interior ministries, as well as national police officers,
periodically asked the military to increase its counterinsurgency efforts during Tole-
do’s government through meetings with military leaders in Lima and, at the regional
and local levels, by telephone.65 The government also gave the army more funds to
fight Sendero. Following a string of deadly insurgent attacks in December 2005 in
the VRAE and the VAH, in early 2006 the government granted both the army and
the national police monies earmarked for counterinsurgency operations. Under
Garcı´a, the government’s ‘‘Plan VRAE,’’ launched in February 2007, directed
further resources toward counterinsurgency.
Until 2008, attempts to increase the army’s counterinsurgency efforts largely
failed.66 The army assigned few counterinsurgency bases to Sendero zones, and the
bases there were had insufficient manpower to support multiday patrols crucial for





















Figure 1. Civilian Control of Peru’s Military
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community and police requests for assistance. Furthermore, the army high command
ceased major operations that in the past had supplemented the work of bases.
Whereas the added 2006 monies spurred no increase in army counterinsurgency
work, the national police used its more or less equal share to form a centralized,
aggressive counterinsurgency unit in the VAH that successfully captured important
Sendero leaders within weeks.67 In this context, former interior minister Fernando
Rospigliosi said of army counterinsurgency efforts, ‘‘What is certain is that the
Armed Forces do not obey Government orders. There is no civilian control over
them. The Armed Forces negotiate with the Government and then do what they
want.’’68 One year later and in response to the Plan VRAE funds, the army did
increase the number of personnel and counterinsurgency bases in the region, but
patrols continued to be cautious, employing intelligence to purposefully avoid con-
tact with Sendero columns, according to a security expert with close-up knowledge
of army tactics in Sendero zones at the time.
Army resistance to counterinsurgency can be explained by developments in the
human rights arena. The above analysis summarized key steps toward holding
military personnel accountable to the civilian justice system for abuses and how
those events triggered resentment among senior and mid-ranking officers. In fact,
for those officers, not only did the measures insult the army but they also made
counterinsurgency difficult by withholding from the army the autonomy it needed
to do the work. All officers interviewed from the senior cohort who complained that
human rights developments had reduced the army’s participation in counterinsur-
gency also thought that the army’s current counterinsurgency assignment contained
an internal contradiction: how, they asked, could an army unit be effective—or even
protect its men—if it must conduct operations while hesitating at every step lest a
civilian be harmed unintentionally, when such harm would trigger legal investiga-
tions and a possible trial?
Return to responsiveness. The Garcı´a administration was well aware of the link
between strengthened human rights protections and army refusal to perform counter-
insurgency. In response, the government successfully increased army counterinsur-
gency efforts through a December 2007 law (Law 29166) that broadened once again
the jurisdiction of military courts and explicitly allowed for armed action in a wide
range of scenarios.69 The new rules of engagement (ROE) permit military personnel
to use their arms against hostile ‘‘intentions’’ as well as hostile acts and define all
crimes committed during military operations as delitos de funcio´n and thereby
within the jurisdiction of the military justice system.
The ROE largely resolved the contradiction for the senior cohort. In a 2009 inter-
view, a general working at the highest echelons of the army said, ‘‘before there was
fear to use weapons, due to the CVR. The rules have given more protection to young
officers and soldiers.’’ Feigning picking up a telephone receiver, as if he were the
executive calling a military officer, he said, ‘‘Otherwise, ‘use your weapons, but
don’t use your weapons.’ It can’t be that way!’’ In response to the ROE, the army
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resumed assertive counterinsurgency efforts in late 2008, with the joint command’s
aggressive Excelencia 777 operation, which left fifteen military personnel dead and
thirty-nine wounded.70
When it comes to mission performance, then, Peru has seen a trade-off between
lowering military prerogatives and increasing military responsiveness. Under Fuji-
mori, the military responded to government orders to combat insurgency in a context
of high military prerogatives. For most of the post-Fujimori period, increased restric-
tions on military autonomy led to military resistance. Finally, since 2008 the military
has returned to conducting assertive counterinsurgency in line with government
demands but only after military prerogatives were increased once again.
As a final point about the army’s resistance to government counterinsurgency
orders, one might think that army leaders’ demands were reasonable—that is, auton-
omy may have been truly necessary to do the work. However, analysis of officer
interview responses suggests that no such requirement exists. Rather, army leaders’
demand for more autonomy has been due to the generational effect of excessive
levels of autonomy during the 1980s and 1990s and the resulting extensive human
rights abuses. Officers of all ranks expressed a strong commitment to counterinsur-
gency as a professional, pride-worthy mission, and yet only members of the senior
cohort insisted on the need for autonomy. First, they perceived a contradiction in the
Toledo government’s order that the army conduct counterinsurgency while being
held accountable to civilian courts. In contrast, only one junior officer saw the ‘‘con-
tradiction.’’ Second, on the whole, members of the senior cohort believed more than
junior officers that civilian casualties were unavoidable during counterinsurgency in
the 1980s and 1990s, and also since 2000.71 Third and finally, the senior cohort
tended to think that the army required similar kinds of autonomy in the post-2000
period as it had experienced under Fujimori. In contrast, junior officers rarely raised
the issue of autonomy at all, and they generally did so only to describe the reality of
the 1980s and 1990s. Some junior officers even criticized the army’s earlier
practices.72
Conclusion
This article has argued that there is a causal interaction between autonomy of
Peru’s armed forces, especially in the human rights arena, and the military’s
mission performance. The new framework can also organize other civil–military
dynamics as interactions between prerogatives and mission performance. For
example, reacting to efforts in Brazil to try military personnel for prior abuses,
in the mid-1990s the armed forces refused to incorporate anticrime work in the
slums (favelas) of Rio de Janeiro into their standard repertoire of missions and
sought to limit their intermittent work there to logistical support.73 Beyond
dynamics involving the particular prerogative of military autonomy vis-a`-vis the
judiciary, budget cuts—an important indicator of civilian control—are hypothe-
sized to cause armed forces to more aggressively embrace new missions as a
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means of justifying defense spending.74 Conversely, budget cuts might also
decrease the armed forces’ capacity, causing the military to refuse to conduct
new, poorly funded operations likely to fail: like a ‘‘living organism subjected
to hypothermia,’’ the militaries might reject ‘‘peripheral functions’’ and focus
only on sovereignty missions.75
In sum, this analysis of the critical case of Peru suggests that we should reexa-
mine the idea that acquiring civilian control of military missions is a final (though
perhaps unobtainable) step in a linear process toward achieving more civilian control
overall. The model put forth here shows us that in fact reducing military prerogatives
can be like squeezing a balloon: it may trigger military contestation in the political
arena, such as rebellion, or it could spur military unresponsiveness when it comes to
mission performance. In turn, military behavior—either contestation or refusal to
carry out missions—may prompt the government to grant the military prerogatives.
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